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1. Executive Summary  
Deraa is known to be the cradle of the 
Syrian uprising of 2011. There were many 
reasons for the province’s increased 
popular resentment against the political 
regime in Syria, including the regime’s 
hardline security policies; its monopoly of 
the public sphere in the interest of a tight 
circle of local middlemen directly linked 
with the security apparatus; the continued 
tightening of the margin of basic freedoms; 
and the uneven development between 
Deraa’s rural and urban areas. 
The protest movement in the Deraa 
province is distinct given the role played by 
Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded 
the involvement of the surrounding rural 
areas. 
The peaceful nature of the uprising in 
Deraa helped to strengthen of the civil 
aspect of the movement, and rendered it 
more effective in the province as a whole. 
The number of organisations in southern 
Syria was at least 38 in 2015, increasing to 
around 50 organisations by the middle of 
2018. Many local councils were also 
formed, helping to fill the governance gap 
in the province resulting from the Syrian 
regime’s gradual withdrawal in 2012. 
In general, the local stakeholders, whether 
local councils or civil society organisations, 
were not able to develop an effective 
economic or administrative system. 
Instead, they mainly relied on the financial 
and technical support provided by 
international donor bodies. 
In the period between 2012 and 2015, the 
province witnessed a number of battles 
between the Syrian military forces and the 
opposition forces, which by the end of 
2015 had taken control of the majority of 
the two southern provinces of Deraa and 
Quneitra. The situation remained largely 
unchanged until the De-escalation 
Agreement of May 2017, which led to a 
relative decrease in the intensity of 
violence, and included all southern areas.  
However, the situation shifted rapidly once 
again at the end of June 2018, when the 
Syrian regime, backed by the Russian 
forces, began a brutal military campaign 
against Deraa. This campaign ended in 
what is known as the Deraa Reconciliation 
Agreement of June 2018, between the 
opposition forces and the regime, carried 
out under the direct oversight of Russia. 
This agreement stipulated return of the 
whole southern area to regime control, with 
the integration of opposition military 
factions into the Russian-backed Fifth 
Corps. However, within the first year of this 
agreement, it became clear that many of 
these points were not adhered to, putting 
into question the ostensible state of 
stability. The Syrian authorities did not 
abide by its commitments, either on the 
security or civilian level, and in particular in 
relation to regularisation of state and 
service provision. 
Furthermore, the central government’s 
refusal to coordinate with the local 
governance bodies in the opposition-held 
areas dampened any hopes of reaching 
real and tangible stability in many 
governance sectors. These included issues 
pertaining to civil registries, such as birth, 
marriage and death certificates, as well as 
those pertaining to property rights. All such 
documents issued by the directorates and 
local councils in opposition-held areas 
were not officially recognised.  
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The challenges described above make it 
difficult to predict how civil society work in 
the Deraa province will develop in the 
coming period. However, looking at various 
indicators from the province, it appears 
that there will be little space for non-relief-
based organisations to operate (this 
includes legal and rights-based 
organisations, and those working in 
violations documentation, advocacy for 
victims, and those working in governance, 
administrative and institutional 
development, and peace building). Most of 
these organisations will be forced 
underground, and will have to coordinate 
with civil society groups present in 
northern Syria, or non-governmental 
organisations working in neighbouring 
countries.  
 
2. Historical Overview  
2.1 Prior to the Emergence of the Syrian State  
 
In order to understand the reality and 
implications of the conflict in southern 
Syria since the 2011 uprising, it is 
important to look back at the historical 
context behind the emergence of identity 
politics particular to the region. This way, 
we will be able to build up a clearer picture 
of the political, cultural and social 
character of this region, which is typified by 
complex familial and tribal dynamics. It will 
also help in explaining some of the social 
phenomena particular to southern Syria, 
such as the relatively low sectarian tension 
in comparison with other Syrian provinces, 
and the emergence of new familial and 
                                                        
1 Horan Foundation, tārīkh ḥorān. 2016. 
http://ahlhoran.org/ar/?p=15703  
2 Michel Lequien, Oriens Christianus, Paris 1740, Vol.II, Coll. 859 
tribal powers during the period of armed 
conflict.  
Southern Syria has long had fertile land 
and a large store of wheat,1 which made 
the area vulnerable to invasion. This was 
particularly the case during the period of 
the Crusades, contributing to an increased 
Christian population in the area. During 
Islam’s expansion in the Levant region, 
many Christian families converted to Islam; 
the Masalimah family, for example, one of 
the biggest Sunni families currently in the 
southern Horan region, had been Christian 
before converting to Islam.2 
The Horan region continued to play an 
important economic role during the 
Ottoman period; the district of Muzayrib 
became a key meeting point for pilgrims, 
and with the Hijaz railroad passing through 
the province, it came to be one of the key 
centres for commercial exchange. During 
that period, the province’s centre changed 
several times, from Muzayrib to al-Shaykh 
Saad, then to al-Shaykh Maskeen, and 
finally to the city of Deraa. The conflict 
between the province’s cities and rural 
areas is thought to have begun with the 
population expansion that took place 
during that time, given the move of the 
province centre from the rural areas to an 
urban one, sparking conflict over power 
and trade.  
During the French Mandate period, the 
region played a significant role in the Great 
Syrian Revolt (1925-1927).3 This was 
manifested in the battles of Khirbet 
Ghazaleh and al-Musayfrah, in coordination 
3  Ali Abdallah, durūs min ath-thawra as-sūrīyah al-kubrah. al-
Modon. 2015. 
https://www.almodon.com/opinion/2015/3/17/ سورد-نم-ةروثلا-
ةيروسلا-ىربكلا  
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with anti-Mandate forces in the 
neighbouring province of Sweida, despite 
the historical sectarian-linked tension 
between the Druze-majority Sweida, and 
the Sunni-majority Deraa. 
2.2 Al-Ba‘ath Party Rule 
For the first four decades of the Ba‘athist 
state, the Al-Ba‘ath Party was 
constitutionally designated ‘The leading 
party in state and society’, and enjoyed 
relatively wide popularity in the south, with 
many of Deraa province’s residents joining 
the party’s ranks. The widespread protest 
movements against the party’s policies 
and their hegemony over all areas of the 
state, which began at the start of the 
1970s and were suppressed militarily at 
the start of the 1980s, did not gain 
significant popular support in Deraa, in 
comparison to provinces such as Aleppo, 
Hama and Damascus.  
A number of factors contributed to the 
Ba‘ath Party’s popularity in Deraa province 
during that period. The most significant of 
these are outlined below: 
1. The socialist economic policies of the 
Ba‘ath Party, which focused on 
supporting farmers and the agricultural 
sector in Syria’s rural areas, which 
made up approximately 80% of the area 
of Deraa province. The party began by 
forming farmers’ cooperatives, 
extension units and implementing 
agricultural reforms. Meanwhile, the 
country’s major commercial and 
industrial cities, such as those of 
Damascus and Aleppo, were 
damaged/disrupted by the 
implementation of nationalisation 
policies, extending to private factories 
                                                        
4 SyriaUntold, Daraa: Land of Grain. The story of the city of Daraa 
in the Syrian revolution. 2016. 
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=405572856233290  
and facilities/businesses. Such 
disruption did not significantly affect 
Deraa province, whose economy relied 
on agriculture.  
2. Giving a greater political role to the 
region, which had been hitherto 
politically marginalised, by raising the 
share allocated to workers and farmers 
in Parliament to 50% of all MPs, and 
giving leading roles in the party and 
state to a number of individuals from 
the south. One such individual was 
Farouq al-Shara‘, who occupied a 
number of positions, most prominently 
foreign minister and vice president. 
Another was Rustum al-Ghazali, who 
occupied several positions in the 
security apparatus in both Syria and 
Lebanon. Alongside this, the network of 
clientelist relationships pertaining to the 
Party was strengthened, pushing many 
people from the southern provinces to 
join institutions supporting the Party, 
such as the Revolutionary Youth Union 
and other unions, such as the Workers’ 
Union and the General Women’s Union. 
3. The location of the province, bordering 
both Occupied Palestine and Jordan, 
contributed to the increased interest of 
the Party in the area, particularly 
against the backdrop of the Syrian-
Israeli conflict.  
2.3 March 2011 to August 2018 
 
On 18 March 2011, the Syrian uprising 
began in Deraa. A group of youth from 
Deraa city left al-Abbas Mosque, and 
headed for al-Omari Mosque, where the 
largest protest against the ruling system 
thus far was held. The trigger for popular 
protests in Deraa city is attributed to the 
detention of a number of children by Syria’s 
security forces a month earlier on 27 
February 2011.4 Protests began to spread 
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in other villages and cities across the 
province, as a result of the severe security 
clampdown pursued by the Syrian 
government, with the continued detention 
and killing of protestors. 
There were many reasons for the 
increased popular resentment against the 
ruling system in Syria, including the 
regime’s hardline security policies; its 
monopoly of the public sphere in the 
interest of a tight circle of local middlemen 
directly linked with the security apparatus; 
the continued tightening of the margin of 
basic freedoms; and the uneven 
development between Syria’s provinces 
and cities. These were compounded by the 
general economic deterioration in the 
country, unmistakably affecting Deraa, and 
Syria’s devastating drought of 2006-2011, 
which created an economic crisis among a 
population which relied primarily on 
agriculture. The negative economic 
approach taken by the regime also severely 
affected Deraa’s population, particularly in 
the suspension of agricultural subsidies by 
the government.5 As well as this, the 
inequitable agricultural and real-estate 
policies in the province contributed to the 
stoppage or obstruction of buying and 
selling agricultural land for Deraa’s 
population; the regime stipulated the 
obtaining of prior security approval by the 
security apparatus, with Deraa’s border 
location given as a pretext. This led to the 
restriction of agricultural and commercial 
activity in the area.  
 
 
                                                        
5 Shamel Azmeh, The Uprising of the Marginalised: A Socio-
Economic Perspective of the Syrian Uprising, LSE Middle East 
Centre paper series (6), Middle East Centre, London 2014 
2.3.1 Peaceful Protests 
The protest movement in the Deraa 
province is distinct given the role played by 
Deraa city in the uprising, which preceded 
the involvement of the surrounding rural 
areas. This is in contrast to the majority of 
Syrian provinces, where the protests were 
led from the countryside. 
The protests in the Deraa province 
remained peaceful up until the beginning of 
November 2011, and armed conflict 
erupted in the area later than in several 
other provinces. We can link this delay in 
militarisation to two main factors, outlined 
below:  
1. The leadership of the movement by 
university-educated urban youth. 
Despite the fact that the province is 
primarily led by family groups, many of 
these families were committed to 
neutrality at the start of protest 
movement, out of fear of the security 
forces. This left the space open for 
young people to lead the protests in the 
area. 
2. The emergence of a number of local 
leaders who were unaffiliated with 
political authority, who were highly 
influential in the local community. Such 
individuals included Ma‘an al-‘Awdat, 
who was a leading figure in the 
peaceful movement, and who was 
assassinated by the Syrian security 
forces in August 2011. Another was 
Ahmad al-Siasina, the sheikh of al-
Omari Mosque in Deraa city. These 
leaders endeavoured to prevent the 
spread of militarisation, as far as was 
possible, and to focus on peaceful 
protest.6 
The peaceful nature of the uprising in 
Deraa helped to strengthen of the civil 
6 An interview conducted by the author with M. Abazeed, a local 
activist from Deraa Province. 2019 
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aspect of the movement, and rendered it 
more effective in the province as a whole. 
The protestors and activists, particularly 
the young people among them, formed 
local coordination groups; these became 
one of the most important sources of 
information and documentation of 
violations by the Syrian authorities, 
alongside their role in civil and relief 
activity. 
Between the end of 2011 and the 
beginning of 2012, many non-
governmental organisations and local 
initiatives emerged, such as Ghosn 
Zeitoun, Horan Foundation and the Public 
Authority for Civil Defence. The number of 
organisations in southern Syria was at 
least 38 in 2015,7 increasing to around 50 
organisations by the middle of 2018. Many 
local councils were also formed, helping to 
fill the governance gap in the province 
resulting from the Syrian regime’s gradual 
withdrawal in 2012. These councils began 
to provide a number of basic services, such 
as water, electricity, education, roads and 
the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.  
2.3.2 Militarisation 
Deraa’s popular uprising, which began 
peacefully, rapidly slid into armed struggle 
with, firstly, the regime’s increasingly brutal 
military and security response, including 
intensified campaigns of detention and 
torture against peaceful protestors, and, 
secondly, the rise in defections from Syrian 
army ranks. Walid al-Qash‘ami, a conscript 
from the town of Abta‘ in Deraa 
countryside who was carrying out his 
                                                        
7 Citizens for Syria, Syrian Civil society Organisations: Reality 
and Challenges. 2017. 
https://citizensforsyria.org/OrgLiterature/Syrian_CSOs_Reality_
and_challenges_2017-CfS_EN.pdf 
military service in the Republican Guard, is 
considered the first defector of the 
uprising, having refused to open fire on the 
residents of Harasta in rural Damascus on 
23 April 2011. First Lieutenant Abdel 
Razzaq Tlas, who defected on 27 April 
2011 from the 15th Brigade near the city of 
Ankhal in Deraa’s western countryside, is 
meanwhile considered the first officer to 
defect, thereafter moving to his hometown, 
the city of Rastan in Homs. Defections 
continued from the officer ranks of the 
Syrian army from then onwards, including 
Lieutenant Ahmad Khalaf in June 2011, 
and Lieutenant Khaldoun Zeineddine from 
Sweida city in July 2011, who started the 
Sultan Basha al-Atrash Battalion and 
fought against the regime in Deraa in the 
area of Lajat.8 
Against the backdrop of these defections, 
and the steady growth of the armed 
movement, the number of armed factions 
in Deraa began to rise considerably, such 
as the Talha bin al-Zubeir Battalion, the al-
Omari Battalion, the Yarmouk Martyrs 
Battalion, the 18th Brigade and the Mu‘taz 
Army.9 The protest movement continued to 
grow, and the increase in the number of 
factions originating in Deraa gave rise to an 
increase in violence employed by the 
Syrian regime in the province. This 
exacerbated  further with the besiegement 
of Deraa city on May 4 2011; the siege 
imposed by the Syrian security forces cut 
off electricity, water, communications and 
medicine from the city, while a security 
clampdown led to the detention of 
8  SyriaInside, dar‘a ḥakāyat ath-thawrah. 2017. 
http://www.syriainside.com/articles/118_ اعرد-ةياكح-ةروث-نم-ةيملسلا-
ىلإ-عقاولا-لاحلاي  
9 Ibid  
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thousands of individuals.10 
At the end of 2012, jihadist groups began 
to emerge in Syria, such as the Al-Qaeda-
affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra. While the 
numbers of fighters in the ranks of these 
groups saw a considerable increase in the 
northern parts of Syria, their initial 
presence in Deraa was limited to a small 
number of fighters, who were primarily 
focused in the southern countryside of the 
province, near the Jordanian border. In the 
middle of 2013, with the intensification of 
conflict and armed violence in the area, the 
numbers of fighters in the ranks of these 
militant Islamist groups in the Deraa 
province began to increase. Some came 
from the southern areas of the Damascus 
province, others from Jordan, while many 
joined these groups from southern Syria 
itself. Their control of the Nassib crossing 
with Jordan, as well as their control of a 
number of granaries and olive presses in 
the province, gave these groups significant 
economic power.  
In the period between 2012 and 2015, the 
province witnessed a number of battles 
between the Syrian military forces and the 
opposition forces, which by the end of 
2015 had taken control of the majority of 
the two southern provinces of Deraa and 
Quneitra.11 The situation remained largely 
unchanged until the De-escalation 
Agreement of May 2017, which led to a 
relative decrease in the intensity of 
violence, and included all southern areas.12 
                                                        
10 The New Arab, Dar‘a … ḥakāyat muḥāfiẓah ash‘al aṭfāluh ath-
thawrah as-sūrīyah. 2017. 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2017/3/18/ اعرد-ةياكح-ةظفاحم-
لعشأ-اهلافطأ-ةروثلا-ةيروسلا   
11 Al-Jazeera, Tawzī‘ manāṭiq as-sayṭarah fī sūriyah. 2016. 
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2016/2/27/ عيزوت-قطانم-
ةرطيسلا-يف-ايروس  
12  Abdullah Almoussa, De-escalation Agreements at the Brink of 
Failure. Atlantic Council. 2018. 
However, the situation shifted rapidly once 
again at the end of June 2018, when the 
Syrian regime, backed by the Russian 
forces, began a brutal military campaign 
against Deraa. This campaign ended in a 
number of local agreements between the 
opposition and the regime, carried out 
under the direct oversight of Russia. These 
agreements stipulated return of the whole 
southern area to regime control, with the 
integration of opposition military factions 
into the Russian-backed Fifth Corps. 
Despite the state of relative peace that 
prevailed during this period, especially with 
the increased direct Russian presence via 
the Russia military police, there continued 
to be sporadic protests, and some military 
action against the Syrian Army’s notorious 
Fourth Division, owing to the continuation 
of looting, theft, detention, and attacks on 
civilians by this Division.13 
 
3. The 2018 Agreement  
In June 2018, as mentioned above, a brutal 
campaign was launched on southern Syria 
by government forces and their allies, 
which ended in the near-total control of the 
provinces of Deraa and Quneitra by the 
Syrian government, and caused a number 
of structural changes to the conflict, both 
on the civilian and military level.14 The 
military campaign conducted by the Syrian 
regime forced the opposition factions into 
negotiations with them, particularly 
regarding the displacement of over 
13 Abdullah Al-Jabassin, From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation 
Era in Daraa, Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of 
Rebel Behaviour During Negotiations, Working Paper, EUI 
RSCAS, 2019/06, Middle East Directions (MED), Wartime and 
Post-Conflict in Syria 
14 International Crisis Group, Lessons from the Syrian State’s 
Return to the South. 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-
east-north-africa/eastern-mediterranean/syria/196-lessons-
syrian-states-return-south 
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300,000 people in the space of just two 
weeks at the beginning of June as a direct 
result of their campaign.15 These 
negotiations between the conflicting 
parties ended in agreements on a number 
of key areas, known as the ‘Deraa 
Agreement’. The following outlines the 
most important points of this Agreement: 
1. ‘Regularisation’ of security status for 
individuals who choose reconciliation 
(over displacement). This regularisation 
covers all dissidents and civilians who 
hand over their weapons, with the 
guarantee they will not be 
prosecuted/pursued by the security 
services, on the condition that they do 
not conduct any actions against the 
state or security services.   
2. Regularisation of legal status for 
dissident officers and volunteers, and 
their discharge from service without 
compensation.  
3. Regularisation of legal status for 
dissident conscripts; they must re-enlist 
in military service within six months, 
and are allowed to leave the country 
after completing their service.  
4. Allowing members of armed groups to 
join the Syrian Army’s ranks, after their 
status has been regularised, upon 
presenting requests to volunteer or be 
contracted by the army.  
5. Entry of Russian police forces and 
Syrian internal security forces to carry 
out security management of the area.  
6. Returning the army to the barracks in 
the southern areas, as long as they are 
not stationed near the neighbouring 
border areas with the Golan, on the 
Israeli border, which is under the control 
of UNDOF peacekeeping forces.  
7. Departure of civilians and soldiers who 
refuse reconciliation, and the terms of 
the agreement, to the areas of Idlib and 
                                                        
15 UN News, 235 alf nāziḥ fī dar‘ā ma‘ istimrār al-a‘māl al-
qitālīyah fī ‘addat manāṭiq ḥawl sūriyah. 2018. 
https://news.un.org/ar/story/2018/07/1012842 
Aleppo countryside in northern Syria.  
8. Securing of crossings by Syrian 
government forces, under the oversight 
of the Russian police.  
9. Entry of Syrian government institutions 
to carry out all service provision for 
citizens: water, electricity, gas, 
healthcare, education, renovation, and 
the restoration of roads.  
10. Handing over heavy- and medium-
grade weapons of those who refuse 
reconciliation, and their departure to the 
north, keeping light-grade weapons and 
four magazines only.  
11. Inclusion of those residing outside Syria 
who wish to return to Deraa in the 
regularisation process, within a set time 
limit, with the option for proxies to hand 
in the request for status regularisation 
on their behalf.16 
However, within the first year of this 
Agreement, it became clear that many of 
these points were not adhered to, putting 
into question the ostensible state of 
stability. The Syrian authorities did not 
abide by its commitments, either on the 
security or civilian level, in particular in 
relation to regularisation of state and 
service provision. The security-related 
issues, in the period after the Agreement, 
can be summarised in five major trends:  
1. Detentions: The 2018 Aagreement 
stipulated that residents of Deraa who 
wanted to stay would not be pursued by 
the security branches. Despite this, the 
Syrian forces conducted extensive 
campaigns of house raids and arrests. 
692 detainees were documented, 
among whom were 29 women, from 
the area, and the majority of whom 
carried the required regularisation 
cards. Among them too were 
individuals who had previously worked 
16 Arabi21, naṣṣ ittifāq la faṣīl mu‘āriḍ ma‘ rūsiyā bi-dar‘ā. 2018. 
https://arabi21.com/story/1105974/ يبرع21-لصحت-ىلع-صن-قافتا-
ليصفل-ضراعم-عم-ايسور-باعرد  
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in the local councils and in 
humanitarian aid,17 during the first eight 
months after the start of the 
Agreement. This crackdown carried on 
sporadically in the area, and has 
continued up to the time of writing.  
2. Assassinations: Over the course of 
around one year, 112 assassination 
attempts were documents, resulting in 
the deaths of 51 people, the majority of 
whom were opposition figures directly 
linked to the negotiations and 
regularisation dossier with the Syrian 
authorities. Identifying those 
responsible for these assassinations is 
difficult; some believe that members of 
military factions opposed to the 
regularisation agreement were behind 
these attacks, while others blame the 
Syrian security apparatus and various 
army divisions, including the Fourth 
Division. This latter argument attributes 
the assassinations to the wish of these 
divisions to maintain chaos in the area, 
and therefore continue to illegitimately 
benefit from the war economy.18 
3. Declaration of popular resistance: At the 
end of 2018, protests emerged in Deraa 
calling for popular resistance against 
the Syrian regime.19 While this 
resistance movement was not an 
organised effort and did not extend 
further than individual actions, the mere 
fact of its existence, and the targeting 
of a number of regime checkpoints, 
rendered the sustainability of stability a 
cause for concern, particularly in light 
of the sensitivity of Deraa’s geographic 
location.20 
4. Lack of clarity over the form and nature 
of the de facto military authorities: 
Despite the fact that southern Syria 
was under the control of Syrian 
governmental forces, in some areas, 
                                                        
17 An interview conducted by the author with O. Mohammad, 
Director of the Documentation Office of the free Horan 
Institution. 2019. 
 
19 Popular Resistance in Deraa, official Facebook page. 
https://www.facebook.com/ ةمواقملا-اةيبعشل-في-داعر-
2015821478721778/ 
such as Deraa city, and villages and 
towns of the western countryside 
including the town of Tafas, there 
remained a clear armed presence of 
Syrian opposition factions. Moreover, 
the Syrian regime forces themselves 
were fragmented, with some loyal to 
Iran, such as the Fourth Division, one of 
the most powerful divisions of the 
Syrian army in the south, and others 
loyal to Russia, such as the Fifth 
Legion, which came to comprise 
individuals and leaders who had 
previously fought under the banner of 
the opposition’s Free Syrian Army. This 
had the potential to give rise to an 
aggravation of these divisions between 
these different forces, and  in turn 
making a flare up in the south 
increasingly likely.21 
5. Mandatory conscription: The 
government forces imposed mandatory 
conscription on young men from the 
area following the end of the 
regularisation period, set in the 2018 
agreement at six months. Many 
conscripts were sent to fight in the Idlib 
province, and with the deaths of around 
30 fighters from Deraa in the battles of 
northern Syria, the security situation in 
the south worsened, with the fury of the 
families over the issue of mandatory 
conscription. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 Syria TV. 2019. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r0yxPwdFdmg 
21 Abdullah Al-Jabassini, From Rebel Rule to a Post-Capitulation 
Era in Daraa Southern Syria: The Impacts and Outcomes of Rebel 
Behavior During Negotiation, Working Paper, EUI RSCAS, 
2019/06, Middle East Directions (MED), Wartime and Post-
Conflict in Syria 
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4. Governance Systems in the Deraa 
Province 
 
Prior to March 2011, the governance 
system in the south was limited to the 
government’s role, with no tangible role 
afford to non-governmental bodies such as 
civil society organisations and trade 
unions. These were not allowed to function 
except according to very stringent 
restrictions, and were only able to perform 
a charitable role. The role of local families, 
which make up one of the most significant 
dynamics and social drivers in the Deraa 
province, was also weak, and was co-opted 
by the regime’s political and security 
system, with heads of families 
incorporated into networks of local 
intermediaries directly linked to this 
system.  
Following the start of the March 2011 
uprising, however, the forms of governance 
adopted were hugely expanded, given the 
plethora of political and armed actors in 
the growing conflict. These included both 
official governmental bodies and quasi-
governmental bodies, the latter 
represented in the local councils and 
technical directorates in opposition-
controlled parts of Syria, as well as civil 
society organisations and local initiatives. 
Such bodies played a fundamental role in 
filling the governance and service gap 
which emerged in many areas which were 
no longer under central government 
control.  
This diversity in the way local governance 
was administered in Syria led to a state of 
                                                        
22 Graduate Institute Geneva, Syrian Civil Society Cooperation, 
Challenges and Opportunities In- and Post-Conflict Implications 
2016  
harmful competition over regional 
administration, specifically between civil 
society organisations and local councils in 
southern Syrian; this competition 
manifested itself around the form and 
nature of administration, and the quality of 
services being provided. Military forces 
also directly intervened as one of the 
actors of governance, even extending to 
some of the armed factions which were 
granted administration of certain service 
sectors, and the enforcement of their own 
governance system.22 
From the end of 2012, when opposition 
control extended over large parts of the 
Deraa province, the majority of governance 
systems in place were characterised by 
weak coordination and cooperation 
mechanisms. This was exacerbated by the 
official government bodies refusing all 
communication and coordination 
mechanisms with their quasi-governmental 
counterparts, such as the councils and 
directorates operating in opposition-
controlled areas.  
For example, before Deraa’s 2018 
agreement was signed, the health 
directorate in Syria’s opposition-held areas 
shared all essential medical data with its 
counterparts in the central government, 
with the consideration that health 
operations should remain outside the 
political sphere.23 However, the Syrian 
government did not in turn, for example, 
recognise the examinations and 
certificates issued by the educational 
directorate operating in opposition-held 
areas. 
23 An interview conducted by the author with Z. Zoabi, a 
member of a Syrian medical organisation. 2019 
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The central government’s refusal to 
coordinate with the local governance 
bodies in the opposition-held areas 
dampened any hopes of reaching real and 
tangible stability in many governance 
sectors. These included issues pertaining 
to civil registries, such as birth, marriage 
and death certificates, as well as those 
pertaining to property rights. All such 
documents issued by the directorates and 
local councils in opposition-held areas 
were not officially recognised, even after 
the Deraa Agreement was signed in June 
2018.  
4.1 Stakeholders in Opposition-Held Areas  
 
While local councils and civil society 
organisations played a key role in 
opposition-held areas, and made 
significant attempts to fill the growing 
governance gap, their management was 
often disordered and chaotic. There are 
several reasons for this, and the most 
significant of these are outlined below:  
1. The multitude of stakeholders 
responsible for the service 
administration, such as organisations, 
councils, local initiatives and military 
forces, as well as such government-run 
institutions operating in opposition-held 
areas.  
2. The absence of a central leadership, or 
even a high-level coordination body, 
keeping together these different 
stakeholders.   
3. The security situation, and the Syrian 
governmental forces seeking to 
separate the eastern countryside from 
the western countryside, preventing 
them from connecting geographically. 
This prevented any kind of coordination, 
                                                        
24  Al-Jazeera, Al-mu‘āriḍah as-sūrīyah tusayṭir ‘ala ma‘bar naṣīb 
al-ḥudūdī. 2015. 
while the security situation meant it 
was a logistical challenge to carry out 
team capacity building, given the 
difficulty of individuals entering and 
leaving the area to attend required 
trainings.  
Overall, there were three main bodies 
charged with service provision and 
governance in opposition-held areas: 1) 
provincial councils and local councils, 2) 
civil alliances and, 3) military forces.  
At the start, military forces did not play a 
major role in service provision and civil 
administration in Deraa, in comparison 
with other provinces. This was primarily 
because of the availability of competent 
and capable civil bodies, both economically 
and administratively; the role of the armed 
forces being focused on military affairs; 
and the power of the locally influential 
families and popular base, which 
supported civil society organisations and 
the councils, as opposed to military 
formations.  
Despite this, military bodies did have some 
administrative role, particularly in the 
control of the Nassib crossing on the 
border with Jordan.24 Their control of 
wheat granaries and olive presses is also 
noteworthy, given that these two goods are 
economically important – particularly in 
relation to their export to neighbouring 
areas.  
The process of governing provinces in 
opposition-held areas was primarily in the 
hands of provincial councils and local 
councils, with technical support provided 
by the opposition’s various directorates, 
such as the health and education 
https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2015/4/2/ ةضراعملا-
ةيروسلا-رطيست-ىلع-ربعم-بيصن  
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directorates. According to many of Deraa’s 
residents, the governing of the province by 
local residents had positive results, since 
they could more easily communicate with 
local communities, and had wide 
knowledge of the area and local needs. 
Despite these positives, the experience 
overall was not as successful as was 
expected. Although the administrative 
structure of the councils was run 
according to a clear hierarchy (the highest 
being the Ministry of Local Administration, 
followed by the Province Council, ending 
with the Local Council),25 this structure did 
not end up being effective. In spite of this 
seemingly hierarchical coordination, the 
reality was that each local council had its 
own different formation mechanism, with 
some using elections, and others 
employing a selection process utilising 
political, tribal and military forces. The 
paucity of financial potential and funding 
opportunities also meant that the extent to 
which they could carry out interventions 
and effective service provision was highly 
limited.26 
In general, the local stakeholders, whether 
local councils or civil society organisations, 
were not able to develop an effective 
economic or administrative system. 
Instead, they mainly relied on the financial 
and technical support provided by 
international donor bodies. The councils 
were not able to play a significant role 
either in terms of organisation or in terms 
of administration, restricting the role of the 
local councils to the following: 
 
                                                        
25 Circular No. 22, Ministry of Local Administration, Relief and 
Refugee Affairs, 31/07/2017. 
26 An interview conducted by the author with J. O. a 
humanitarian worker in an INGO working in Deraa. 2019. 
1. Providing funding proposals and needs 
assessments to Syrian civil society 
organisations, affording these 
organisations positions of power; in 
certain cases, they came to be the 
bodies with the greatest influence over 
the decisions of local councils.  
2. A supervisory role over funding policies, 
which was itself limited because of the 
lack of financial potential and of internal 
administrative capacities.27 
While the provincial councils sought to 
provide licenses to civil society 
organisations, with the aim of controlling 
the presence and working mechanisms of 
these organisations, these licenses did not 
have any real benefits. Moreover, the chain 
of relationships within the non-
governmental organisations and local 
councils grew to resemble those of state 
institutions, in terms of patronage, hiring 
relatives, and uneven development 
between neighbouring towns and villages. 
Gender equality, or the lack thereof, is 
considered among the chief shortcomings 
within these organisations and local 
councils, with a clear absence of women in 
management posts. The majority of 
women-centred projects focused 
essentially on women being craftspeople 
only, this becoming clear from the number 
of embroidery projects through which the 
organisations targeted women, without 
really thinking about creating projects 
which could empower women politically, 
economically, and in terms of governance.  
 
 
 
27 An interview conducted by the author with Z. Zoabi, a 
member of a Syrian medical organisation. 2019.  
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4.2 Governance Recommendations in Deraa 
Province    
 
1. Decentralisation: The employees of 
every major sector, such as education, 
health, agriculture, urban and 
investment development, should work 
through a decentralised approach at 
the province level, within a wide margin 
of independence from central 
governance. This relates specifically to 
the management of local resources 
(human and material); the management 
of local revenues; and the distribution 
of roles and powers between the 
province and administrative units, as is 
appropriate for the local community.  
2. Advancement of development projects, 
as well as that of the private and 
investment sector. 
3. Self-governing of the province and its 
villages: This is with the aim of reducing 
communal tension, protecting against 
corruption, and reducing patronage and 
clientelism as far as possible. With the 
governance of the province and its 
administrative units being carried out 
by members of the local community 
itself, applying societal pressure on 
those in charge would become easier. 
This is particularly true of the southern 
Syrian communities, which have strong 
tribal and familial ties, which could thus 
become a means of societal 
accountability. 
4. Reducing restrictions on civil society 
organisations: Given the current 
situation, such restrictions end up being 
harmful to all, particularly given the fact 
that these organisations were able to 
meet the majority of local community 
needs over the last seven years. It is 
also crucial to benefit from their 
experience and impartiality during the 
state-building process. 
 
 
                                                        
28 Citizens for Syria, Syrian Civil society Organisations: Reality 
and Challenges. 2017. 
5. Recognition of documents issued by 
quasi-governmental bodies: It is 
necessary to create a mechanism for 
recognising certificates and documents 
issued by quasi-governmental bodies, 
in order to avoid major problems 
related to education and family matters, 
such as the documenting of births and 
deaths.  
 
5. Civil Society 
5.1 Overview of Civil Society in the Deraa 
Province 
The number of civil society organisations 
has significantly increased since the start 
of the Syrian uprising in March 2011, with 
this being particularly evident in the areas 
of southern Syria. This is the result of the 
military power shifts in the south, and the 
resultant fragility of Syrian governmental 
control; the significant funding 
opportunities due to donor focus on 
supporting areas of southern Syrian; the 
enormous humanitarian needs resulting 
from the war; and the inclination/trend of 
the majority of peaceful activists to civil 
[society] work, particularly after the 
proliferation of armed factions in the south.  
According to a study carried out by the 
organisation IMPACT, southern Syria 
witnessed the emergence of over 50 non-
governmental organisations between 2011 
and 2018, with the majority founded 
between 2013 and 2015. These 
organisations were active in a number of 
fields, including education, health and 
relief, alongside organisations specialised 
in working with youth, women or children.28 
These organisations came to rank among 
the biggest players in terms of governance 
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and service provision, even assuming the 
role of the state in many areas. 
Organisations such as Ghosn Zeitoun, for 
example, assumed responsibility for 
education in large parts of the province; the 
Public Authority for Civil Defence, 
meanwhile, oversaw the provision of basic 
services such as electricity, water and 
infrastructure. Other organisations, 
meanwhile, such as Farah Organisation, 
worked specifically in the field of 
governance, and conducted capacity 
building for those working within the local 
councils.29 
Such organisations also played a major 
role in reducing conflict and contributing to 
the peacebuilding process, through their 
consensus-building role in many parts of 
southern Syria. The organisations 
operating in southern Syria had wide-
ranging relationships with other 
stakeholders, such as governmental and 
quasi-governmental bodies. They also had 
strong coordination capacities, and were 
able to coordinate with various UN 
agencies operating in southern Syria from 
Jordan. Finally, they had a distinct role in 
reducing the economic and social burdens 
for communities in southern Syria. 
However, the Syrian government’s 
recapture of southern Syria in June 2018 
led to the closure of the majority of these 
civil society organisations, either by the 
direct order of the regime’s security 
apparatus, or by the organisation itself, out 
of fear of pursuit and detention by the 
security services. 
 
                                                        
29 Farah Organisation, Education Governance Programme in Southern of 
Syria. 2018. 
5.2 The Future of Civil Society Organisations 
in the Deraa Province  
After the breakdown of the 2017 De-
escalation Agreement and the Syrian 
government forces’ recapture of southern 
Syria, the number of operational 
organisations went down from 50 to 10, 
specifically during the first six months after 
the June 2018 Agreement was signed. 
Most of the organisations which remained 
were branches of organisations in 
government-controlled areas which had 
previously obtained licenses; the Syrian 
government prohibited the operation of all 
organisations which had worked in 
southern Syria that were established after 
March 2011. 
After the June 2018 Agreement, which led 
to the forced displacement of many 
residents of southern Syria to the north, 
some activists displaced from the Deraa 
province tried to re-activate their work in 
the areas of Idlib and northern Aleppo. 
However, this was limited to providing 
relief services to those displaced from 
Deraa, and organising IDP camps for them. 
Despite this, during the few months 
following the June 2018 Agreement, there 
were some exceptions within the province, 
which cannot be generalised to civil society 
work in southern Syria as a whole. For 
example, a few Syrian organisations 
operating specifically in the field of relief 
were able to gain licenses from the Syrian 
authorities, under new names, some of 
them even run by those known to be on the 
side of the opposition. One possible reason 
for this is the Syrian government’s need for 
service providers, given that it does not 
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have the financial and administrative 
capacities itself to meet the growing needs 
of the local communities in southern Syria. 
Moreover, given the precariousness of the 
security situation in southern Syria, all 
parties have been obliged to consider 
working with civil society organisations, 
which are better placed to communicate 
with local communities and reduce 
potential future conflict. Lastly, the 
relationship between civil society 
organisations and the private sector helped 
to sustain civil society work, with many 
private companies utilising their licenses to 
facilitate the work of humanitarian 
organisations. 
The challenges described above make it 
difficult to predict how civil society work in 
the Deraa province will develop in the 
coming period. However, looking at various 
indicators from the province, it appears 
that there will be little space for non-relief-
based organisations to operate (this 
includes legal and rights-based 
organisations, and those working in 
violations documentation, advocacy for 
victims, and those working in governance, 
administrative and institutional 
development, and peace building). Most of 
these organisations will be forced 
underground, and will have to coordinate 
with civil society groups present in 
northern Syria, or non-governmental 
organisations working in neighbouring 
countries.  
In terms of charitable relief organisations, it 
appears that these will be allowed to work 
in the province, as long as they are 
branches of other charitable organisations 
licensed in Damascus prior to March 2011. 
Otherwise, they will have to apply for new 
licenses from the Ministry of Social Affairs, 
with new names and new teams.  
5.3 Civil Society Recommendations in Deraa 
Province 
 
1. Imposing specific conditions on the 
funding of Syria’s reconstruction by the 
international community: This is with 
the aim of putting pressure on the 
Syrian government to widen the margin 
of civil society work in the areas of its 
control; offering legal guarantees to 
protect civil society workers and 
activists; and working towards 
mechanisms for monitoring the extent 
to which civil society in Syria is able to 
function freely.  
2. Reducing political and ideological 
polarisation of Syrian civil society 
organisations: It should be necessary 
for civil society alliances, to begin 
building relationships with Syrian 
organisations spanning different 
political affiliations, in order to enhance 
the sustainability of civil society work in 
Syria.   
3. Advocating on the protection of 
humanitarian workers: It is crucial that 
advocacy organisations apply 
sustained pressure on international 
bodies and Syrian governmental bodies 
to guarantee the protection of 
humanitarian workers, and the 
continuation of their work.   
4. Self-funding for the Syrian non-
governmental organisations and local 
initiatives: The development of self-
funding mechanisms would serve to 
reduce the excessive dependence on 
international donors, as would the 
development of revenue-raising 
projects.  
5. Increasing civil society’s role in 
designing and monitoring the 
development and reconstruction efforts: 
It is important to advocate for the 
inclusion of Syrian civil society as a 
major player in the reconstruction 
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process. Since they are the most 
impartial actors in the Syrian conflict, 
their direct involvement would 
guarantee, to a significant extent, that 
the reconstruction period would not 
become politicised.  
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